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I Introduction 
The title of this paper suggests an importance of “institutionalism，” 
especially, in twent出血 centuryAmerican economic thouゆt.In spite of 
its importance, institutionalism is litle known outside the United States, 
much les as an indigenous American approach to political economy In 
the view of Western scholars，出enotion of political economy is predomi-
nantly assoc阻ted明白血eMarxist school But because of its ideological 
and political implicat10ns, Marxism has not been accepted in the United 
States Under these circumstances, inst1tutionahsm has emerged as a 
critic of mainline economics -Neoclassical as well as Keynesian and, 
thereby, as an indigenous approach to pohl!cal economy. Thus, institu-
tionahsm employs a different methodoloめFto血edisc1plme of econom-
ics, and moreover, focuses upon the broader social and political character 
of economic life. Because it did not focus solely on economics, mstitu-
t10nalism has been often accused of not being pertinent to economics. 
Nevertheless, mstitutionahsm as a cntic to mainlme economics has 
evolved its analyses according to what goes on in socieザ．
This paper examines modern large-scale co中orat10ns泊 theInst1tu-
tionalist school of economics, and, thereby, is divided into two sections: 
The first section clarifies白eimportance of modern large-scale corpora-
lions, which the Institut10nahsts have discussed in their theories of both 
dyriamic and power systems. Here, its focus is upon classical Institution-
alis臼， ThorsteinVeblen and John R. Commons The second secl!on 
describes the Institutionalist views on changes, concerning modern large-
scale corporations, since World War I. Here, the emphasis is upon the 
concept of John K. Galbraith and, then, an alternative to his concept. 
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Il Classical Institutionahsts on Modern Large-Scale Corporation 
Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons are today considered to 
be foundmg fathers of the Inslltut10nalist school of economics. Both 
scholars have witnessed the breakdown of the classical system and the fol-
lowing emergence of contemporary capitalism with increasing threat of 
communism and fascism. As Insl!tutionalists, they have thus identified 
technological advancement as an underlying dynamic of such capitalist 
transformation, and modern large-scale corporations as its locus of power 
which .has spearheaded the transformation However, there is a basic 
difference between Veblen and Commons, in terms of the conceptual ap-
proach to contemporary capitalism. The difference is that Veblen focused 
upon the dynamic process of capitalist evolution, while Commons em-
phasized contemporary capitalism as a power system 
(I) Thorstein Veblen: Evolutionary Capitalism 
Veblen begins his analyses by questioning stal!c a田umptionsof tech 
nology and institution in the Neoclassical/Marginalist thought, and, 
thereby, focuses upon the life-history of material civilization, in which 
the dynamics of development consists of廿ieinteracting changes between 
technology and institut10ns From his viewpoint, the evolut10n of capital-
ism from competitive to monopohstic system is thus a study of mstitu-
tional changes upon the basis of technological advancement In the study 
of mstitut10nal changes, that of血emost significance is undoubtedly the 
emergence of modern large scale corporations and their consequent rise 
to a position of economic dommance, notably in the “key industries”of 
natural resources, power, and transportation 
Historically, the development of modern technology and its resultant 
application gave rise to the modern industrial system, as“a concatenation 
of processes which has much of the character of a smgle, comprehensive, 
balanced mechanical process.＇’IU While it rests with the businessmen to 
make the runn旧Eadjustments of industry, a disturbance m such a system 
creates a chance for them to gain or lose, and, thereby, becomes subject 
to their shrewd mampulations. As the modern mdustrial system becomes 
dominant m economic production, the chances for g剖nor loss grow clear-
ly in number and magnitude. By contrast, it is from the middle of the 
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nineteenth century血atthe productive capacity began visibly overtakmg 
the market capa口ty.As a result, there arose risks of overproduction四 d
falling price; so血atfree competition without afterthought becomes no 
longer possible for the busmessmen 12In order to avoid overproduct10n 
and maintain a profitable price, it became necessary for the industry as 
a whole to restrict the rate and volume of production, and, thereby, for 
the businessmen to concentrate business mterest and capital Given such 
a historical situation，血ebusinessmen chose the most suited method, 
出atis, the corporate form of business organization Since the corporate 
form made the concentration of business interest and capital possible by 
issuing marketable stocks and bonds, the businessmen were enabled to 
create and maintain economic profit not only through the restnction of 
rate and volume of output, but also through greater control of resource 
markets For Veblen，血ecorporate form of business organization was 
thus designed to pursue economic profit for the continuous mvestment. 
As the scope of corporate finance was necessarily enlarged from com-
mon to preferred stock, from stock to bond, and lastly to“loan credit，＇’ 
the growth of modern co甲orationsbrought about two important insti-
tutional changes・ One is出eseparation of （“absentee”） ownership and 
management, and the other is the expanded business role of白iancial
institut10ns, managing loan credit According to Veblen, both institu-
tional changes combined with technological advancement would lead 
the modern industrial system toward depresSion and monopoly 
As suggested above, corporate fmance was essentially to concentrate 
business interest and capital, and, m turn, to capitalize“unrnaterial earn-
ing capacity”based upon powers of monopoly and monopsony, rather 
than physical industnal equipments For Veblen, such earmng capacity 
of modern corporat10n was the economic basis to determine whether 
to invest in stock or bond and how far to extend loan credit.1" The en-
largement in the scope of corporate finance served only to widen dis-
crepancy between business capital and industrial equipment, and，出us,
causes the corporation's over-and under-capitalization. As a whole, the 
modern industrial system results in creating busmess fluctuat10ns, which 
would be led eventually toward depression. With the high fixed cost of 
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large-scale production and the decreasing cost of technology-based 
product10n, business fluctuat10ns make cut-throat competition severe 
and, m turn, the industry monopolized. 
While the enlargement in the scope of corporate finance also creates 
an ever increasing volume of waste and misd1rection in the use of eqmp-
men ts, resources, and manpower, the modern mdustnal system is increas-
ingly alienated from the technological forces which are largely responsible 
for its emergence. According to Veblen, this raises the necessity of a 
new industnal order devoted to efficient maximum producl!on円Because
of underlying productive and technological factors of the system, a new 
industrial order should be laid down by “the Soviet of Technicians，”not 
only who are directly responsible for, but also whose attitudes and habits 
of thinking are shaped by production and technology. An alternative sce-
nario is the emergence of a business-military complex or, more strongly, 
the fascist regime in the modern industrial system. Whatever the prospec-
t1ve outcome wil be, it is m Veblen's view that the modern industrial 
system is animated by出eemergence and growth of modern large-scale 
corporations, though based upon the technological advancement. 
(2) John R. Commons: Reasonable Capitalism 
For Commons, institutional economics 1s the study of“collective 
acl!on in control, libera!Jon, and expansion of individual action”朗Nota-
bly, collective action泊 contemporarycapitalism ranges ubiquitously 
from uno弔問包edcustom to many organized“going concerns，” such as 
corporation, labor unions, and political parties. Collective act10n star臼
with “scamty，＇’ as does individual action m the neoclassical analysis. 
But according to Commons, scar口ty1s the starting point of a negotia-
hon proce田， butnot of an economizing process This is because the con-
cept of scarcity includes here血eownership power to control thmgs 
Thus, Commons perceived the economy not only as a process for 
economizing, but also as a system of power. 
For the purpose of investigation, the minimum unit of collecl!ve 
action 1s defined as a social relation of man-to-man or a“transaction，” 
which “must contain in itself the three principles of conflict, dependence, 
and order.”16 Because its interaction with scarcity creates conflicts of 
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interest “predominant in transactions，”ownership曲目becomesthe basis 
for the study of collective action As long as transactors are mutually 
dependent as well as conflicting, the transfer of ownership is most likely 
to be negotiated according to the workmg rule of the society. Notably, 
the negotiation process rests on the sovereign power of the state as exer-
口sed血roughjudicial systems, because sovere唱ntyas collective action 
in control of physical force担terpretsrts lawfullness in correlat10n 
(7) 
with law, economics, and ethics As a result, the negotiation proce田
does not create an equilibnum of the traditional economics, but a certain 
security of expectation or order represent泊E“reasonablevalues ” 
The tran阻ctionsare class1f1ed泊 threeways: bargaining (transactors 
as legal equal), managenal (transactors as individual legal superior and 
mferior, for example, foreman and worker), and rationing (transactors 
as collective legal superiors and inferiors, for example, a state legislature 
and its citizenry, a labor union and its members). All the classified 
transactions characterize contemporary capitalist economy However, 
血eemergence and grow血 ofmodern large-scale corporat10ns, which 
marked the transformation of capitalism, had the greatest impact on 
and, in turn, widened the dimension of “bargaining”町nongthe clasi-
fled transactions. 
Even血oughtransactors are legally equal in a “bargaining”negotia-
tion, there are differences泊 therrpowers of duress (the use of physical 
power), coercion (the use of economic power), and persuatrnn (the use 
of moral power). Since its result rs influenced by their differential 
powers, the balance of powe四回nongtransactors rs a precondition for 
proper bargaining negotiations But血roughusing their monopolistrc 
positions, modern large-scale corporations deprive the power of, espe-
cialy, coercion from individual labors and consumers For the balance 
of power, there arises a necessity of what are today known as“counter-
vailing powers”＇＂ For example, labor unions are organized as counter-
va姐恒Epowers to face large-scale corporat10ns with monopohstic power. 
As countervaihng powers are organized, bargaining negotiat10n thus 
widens its dimension from individualistic to collective nature. 
官官 successof large-scale corporations and labor unions in也e
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concentration of economic as well as political power stimulated the 
formation of many other afftliated interest of large scale. For thIS reason, 
contemporary capitalism is characterized by organization pluralism. But 
because large-scale organizations embody the managenal transaction, 
which assumes efficiency as its principle and hierarchy as its order, such 
organizational pluralism is to widen the difference of political power be-
tween leaders and subordmates and, thereby, to increase the difficulty 
of internal control of organizational leaders. Based upon the concept of 
countervailing power, collective (national) bargaining provides here a 
ground for negotiation in the form of the reciprocal control of leaders 
Thus, collective bargaming is essential for contemporary capitalist econ-
omy, as a power system and economizing process In other words, con-
temporary capitalism for Commons is in“血eage of collective action”ω 
皿 InstitutionalistViews on Postwar American Economy 
The most prominent, contemporary institut10nalist is John K. 
Galbraith. Following the institutionalist tradition, Galbraith has identified 
large-scale corporations as the locus of contemporary capitalism, and 
technological changes as its underlying dynamic. While the development 
of postwar American economy has given nse to the term“planning，” 
corporate planning is not only indicative of market power, which enables 
large-scale corporations to manage thelf profit. But It is also “imperative” 
because of the applicat10n of mcreasingly intricate and sophistJcated 
technology to the production of things, in which the corporations have 
been involved since the beginning of World War JI. In Galbraith’s view, 
corporate planning 1s thus a core of the “planning system，＇’ which 
approx恒国tesa capitalist version of a planned economy 
(I) John K. Galbraith: Corporate Planning and Technostructure 
Since the application of the technology is charactenzed by the m-
creasing commitment of both time and money and the increased need for 
special包edmanpower and orgamzal!on, it is too risky and unreliable for 
the corporations to depend upon the market mechanism, which may 
cause senous flatenng of product demand or resource supply if left alone 
to coordinate the economy" In order to face such a situation, large-scale 
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corporations employ various strategies, includmg sales promotion, verti-
cal mtegration, internal fmancing (to msulate themselves from interven-
tions of stockholders and creditors), impenal control over raw matenal 
m Third World countries, and multinational operations Thus, corporate 
plann泊gis“＇imperative”to avoid risks of market flaterings and to 
execute business strategies. Jn other words, large-scale corporations 
supercede, suspend, or control the market through, and, thereby, replace 
its mechanism with .their corporate plannmgs. 
As well as the enlargement of corporate finance with widespread 
stock ownership, the expansion of specialization based upon the applica-
t1on of the technology has stimulated the田parationof ownership and 
management But m Galbraith's VJew, the increased need for speciahza-
lion gave rise to出e“technostructure，＇’由atis, an organization em-
bracing“al who bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to 
group decision-makmg・”＂Notably,the technostructure includes most 
of executive-management personnel. 
The expansion of speciahzation ・involves great numbers of exper臼
of bo血technologyand organization. Being professional specialist, each 
expert accumulates knowledge and experience to supplement his talent 
As a matter of fact, modern corporations cannot be operated without 
血osequalities; in turn，血ishas reinforced an bargaming power of the 
management against the ownership. But at the same time, the expansion 
of specialization makes decISion-making .complex and beyond any泊di-
vi dual’s competence, while leading each expert to have only a fraction 
of experience and information about any other than his speciality. Jn 
order to make a meaningful decISion for the whole, large-scale corpora-
tions nece田itatean adept, orgamzed, and collective committee of special-
ized experts, thereby, the technostructure Not the management, but 
the technostructure is thus“the guiding mtelligence一白ebram of 
”。，the enterorise.  
According to Galbraith, a goal of the technostructure is “the greatest 
posSible rate of corporate growth as measured泊 sales，＇’whtlea certain 
mimmum level of earning must be maintained to pay reasonable d1吋ー
dends and, thereby, secure its managenal independence." Notably, 
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technological progre田 isalso hsted as its goal, because capacity for 
corporate growth depends largely upon capacity for innovation." On 
one hand, corporate growth means the same as expansion of the techno-
structure, in turn, such expans10n results m“more jobs with more 
responsibili句rand hence more promotion and more compensation.”On 
the o血er,corporate grow血 increasespower and prestige of the corpora-
tion and its technostructure, politically as well as economically. Because 
of its great effects on“promot10n, pay, perqmsities, prestige, and power：’ 
co中orategrowth is thus idenllfied with a goal of也etechnostructure. 
Moreover, Galbraith has contended both町iplicitlyand explicitly that 
血egrowth orientation of the technostructure, coupled with its ability 
of corporate planning, has changed出erelation of large-scale corpora-
lions with their unions and the government from “countervailing”to 
“symbiotic." 
Concerning the relat10n with a union, there are three important facts: 
First, corporate growth increases its size and membership, and, thereby, 
provides great effects on promotion, pay, and job security of its admin-
istrators. Second, collectIVe bargaining factlitates price-setting and 
maintenance for corporate planning・Third,large-scale corporat10ns have 
the power to pass on wage increases in the form of price boosts while 
avoidmg interrupted production caused by a prolonged strike. Thus, 
the umons have reasons to cooperate with the corporations and does 
not fmd themselves in the old Capital-Labor conflict°' In other words, 
the unions dimm1sh their role as countervailmg powers against the 
corporallons and, in turn, their bureaucratic admmistrations enter mto 
也esymbiotic relations with the technostructure of血eirrespectable 
corporations. 
The modern state has its aims and goals, as explained by Galbraith: 
“The state is strongly concerned with the stability of the economy 
And 、Niththe technical and scientific advancement And, most notably, 
with the national defense. There are the national goals.”＂Accordingly, 
the government provides appropriate actions, which the corporat10ns 
seek to reinforce corporate planning, for “the regulation of aggregate 
demand, the provision of trained manpower through the educational 
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system，出eunderwriting of new capital and technology, and to some 
degree, the promot10n of wage-price stab出ty.”聞 Inthe modern state, 
moreover, administrative bureaucracies are most dommant organs, be-
cause the executive cannot function without them, and the legislature 
cannot fulfil its particular泊terestwithout their backmgs. Since ad-
ministrative bureaucracies are in charge of those appropriate government 
ac!ions, it can be said that, given national goals, their Size increases as 
血ecorporations grow larger and, in turn, seek more actions from the 
government. This symbiotic rela!ionsh1p between the technostructure 
and the admimstrative bureaucracies is thus described as follows：同
. The modern state ... is not the executive committee of the 
bourge01sie but it is more nearly the executive committee of the 
technostructure. 
(2) An Alternative to出eTechnostructure 
The development of technology and, thereby, the expansion of spe-
ciahzation have brought about出eemergence and growth of large-scale 
co中orations泊 contemporarycapitalism. Here, the term“large-scale” 
is indicative of increases m the size and complexity, for the corporat10ns ， 
more people must be involved for coordmation, and more variables and 
mfonτiations must be reqmred for dec1s10n 
nings are successfully executed upon the bases of proper coordination 
and prompt declSlon makmg, large-scale makes it not only difficult, if 
not impossible, but also ineffective or infeasible, to depend upon in-
formal and spontaneous methods of control Because of these difficulty 
and infeasibility, large-scale corporations institutionalize hierarchical 
control and, thereby, bureaucracy However, bureaucracy involves an 
inherent weakness. That is, as a corporate s田eincreases, the adminis-
trative load on managers may increase to such a point that they cannot 
perfonn their responsibility efficiently. In other words, the ability of 
the managers becomes strained and even collapsed because of the volume 
and complexity of the demands placed upon them. As earlier suggested, 
Galbraith has identified the technostructure as the latest stage m出e
shift of the locus of corporate power, and introduced its concept to 
deal with such a weakness of large-scale corporat10ns. Even though the 
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technostructure is a committee of group decision-making, its concept 
presupposes bureaucratic structure for large-scale corporations. Thus, 
an alternative to the technostructure is also to bureaucratic structure; 
thereby, it must embody an organizational mnovation 
The organizational theorists, A.D. Chandler and Oliver E Williamson, 
have identified an organizational innovation in corporate structure with 
the multidivisional (M-form) structure Notably, the bureaucratic organi-
zation is defined as the unitary (U-form) structure. While the U-form 
co中orationswere dominant m prewar American economy, the emer-
gence of M-form structure among large-scale corporations is largely a 
postwar phenomenonー thoughits first unplemental!on was at Du Pont 
and General Motors dunng the early 1920’s Moreover, 1t is said that, 
in the United States, the M-form “was substantially in place by the 
l 960's.”ω 
The M form structure involves “the creation of semi-autonomous 
operating ・divisions . . organized along product, brand, or geographic 
lines."" Also, there is a general office “consisting of a number of power-
ful general executives and large advisory and financial staffs.＇’°＂In order 
to elimmate inherent weakness of bureaucral!c, large-scale corporations, 
the M-form structure thus promotes a division of labor between divisions 
and a general office. Even though this division of labor means decentrali-
zation, a general office exercises internal incentive and controls泊stru
ments in a discrimmating way." This is because a general office monitors 
出eperformance of each divis10n m terms of overall fmancial returns, 
and in turn reallocates capital among divisions to favor hiゆ yieldusers 
Thus, a general office exists as a fmancial capitalist within the M-form, 
large-scale corporal!ons, though miniature in comparison with com-
mercial banks and other mstitutions. 
As a miniature capitalist, a general office organizes divis10ns m the 
pursuit of profit (or the rate of削 urn),in turn, the M-form structure 
not only eliminates an inherent weakness of the U-form structure, but 
also alleviates the conflict of interest between stockholder and manage 
ment Even though this may be true, it is wrong to say that the M-form 
co中orationshave the profit, rather吐ianthe growth orientation This 
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is simply because the growth of financial capitalists is generally calcu-
lated in monetary value. Especially, when a general office tnes to in-
sulate itself from outside creditors, the amount of profit determines 
that of investment fund and, thereby, the corporate growth Under this 
cyclical relation, it is easy to assume that the M-form corporation de-
velops into a conglomerate and/or engages in multinational opera！旧国
In contrast to Galbraith’s concept of modern state, the dominance of 
M-form corporations m postwar American economy thus characterizes 
the transformation from mdustrial to financial capit剖ism.
N Conclusion 
While focusing its analyses on modern large-scale corporations, the 
primary purpose of this paper has been the exposition rather than the 
evaluation of the Institutionalist school of economics. As earlier stated, 
institutionalism is an indigenous American approach to political econo-
my. But in companson with such a回 lystsas Karl Marx and Joseph 
Schumpeter, it is possible to criticize American Institutionalists because 
of their narrow analytical viewpoints. In other words, the analyses of 
Amencan Inshtutionalists have been “framed within a limited time 
perspective and with reference chiefly to American conditions ”Even 
though出ecriticism may be true for the individual analySis, the school 
of American Institutionahsts has produced the comprehensive view on 
the institutional evolution of American capitalism. While repeated num-
bers of t加esm白ISpaper，由econceptual core of iiistitutionalism has 
been stated in the beginning of Veblen’s book, The Theory of Business 
Enterprise, as follows：” 
τfie matenal framework of modern civilization is the industrial 
system, and the drrecting force which ammates this framework is 
business enterprise. 
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アメリカ制度学派の学説にみる
現代の大規模株式会社
〈要約〉
大森達也
制度学派（または制度主義）は，今世紀のアメリカにおける経済学説を
語るとき，忘れられないものではあるが，アメリカ以外においては，政
治経済学と制度学派との関係は，あまり知られてはいない。一般に，現
代の政治経済学は， 7 ノレタス経済学と結びつけて考えられる。しかし，
アメリカにおいては， 7ルクス主義の持つ政治思想のため，受け入れら
れることはなかった。他方，制度学派は，新古典派・ケインズ派を批判
する立場を取り，結果的に，アメリカの土着的な政治経済学の理論的7
レームワークとして発展して来たのである。
アメリカ制度学i慌の、土着的。という意味は，一般に修正資本主義と
呼ばれる現代アメリ力的経済体制を研究対象としていることで，歴史的
時間の制約と，園内の事象だけにたよることとなり，学説的には，普遍
性を持ちあわせていないことである。しかし，現代アメリ力的経済体制
の成立過程が，大規模株式会社の台頭と，彼等の独占的地位の確立によ
って進んだと考えるならば，制度学派の学説的中で，現代の大規模株式
会社は重要な課題でなければならない。と言うより，学説的展開を技術
と諸制度の相互依存的な変化に重点をおくアメリカ制度学派にとって，
現代の大規模株式会社は相互依存的変化の媒介町役割をしていると考え
られるからである。また，代表的な制度学派（ここでは，ウeェプレン コ
モンズ・ガノレプレイス）の学説を，年代順に検討することによって，大規
模株式会社のさまざまな変化を，分析することができるのである。
